



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
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# **COMBATING SUBVERSIVELY MANIPULATED CIVIL DISTURBANCES**

by

**Ad-ian H. Jones,  
Andrew R. Molnar**

**October 1966**

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
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## FOREWORD

The increasing use of civil disturbances by those attempting to illegally achieve political power has added a new dimension to the problem of maintaining internal security. Preventing such subversive manipulation and dealing with it when it occurs is a complex problem which faces internal security forces. This problem persists during periods free from insurgency, through the several recognized phases of insurgency, and into the postinsurgency period regardless of the insurgency's rate of progress or its outcome.

Attention has been devoted to studying the separate factors involved, such as subversion, the control of crowds and mobs, and community conflict. However, apparently little systematic study has been conducted relative to the interrelationships involved in controlling the subversive manipulation of crowds and civil disturbances. This report attempts to: (1) develop a framework which will facilitate systematic study, (2) apply that framework to information produced by both social scientists and operational personnel, and (3) suggest further study within this framework that might aid in developing more effective countermeasures to subversive manipulation.

In the process a number of hypothesized relationships stated in the form of questions are suggested which, if answered by future research, could prove of value to internal security forces faced with the problem of controlling the subversive instigation of collective civil violence.

## CONTENTS

Foreword . . . . .	iii
Summary . . . . .	1
Introduction . . . . .	9
Chapter I. The Subversively Manipulated Civil Disturbance . . . . .	17
Chapter II. The Strategy of Subversion and the Tactics of the Subversive Manipulation of Civil Disturbances . . . . .	23
Chapter III. Internal Security Forces Countermeasures . . . . .	35
Chapter IV. Conclusions . . . . .	57
Footnotes . . . . .	65
Annotated Bibliography . . . . .	69
Distribution List . . . . .	79
DD Form 1473 . . . . .	81

## **SUMMARY**

### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

Civil disturbances have occurred throughout history in most areas of the world, especially during periods of rapid social change. Recent civil disturbances aimed at subverting existing governmental authority in countries around the world have focused renewed attention upon this phenomenon. Knowledge of the techniques of manipulating crowds and civil disturbances is necessary to the development of effective countermeasures.

Instigators of collective violence attempt to capitalize upon existing conflict within a community's environment. Societies are composed of communities, which are made up of organizations and smaller collectivities such as work, family, and friendship groups. Communities can be described in several dimensions, according to their ethnic, social class, religious, economic, political, and geographic composition. Most civil disturbances take place in villages, towns, cities, and the geographical subdivisions of larger cities.

### **THE SUBVERSIVELY MANIPULATED CIVIL DISTURBANCE**

Within the community context the major participants in civil disturbances are: (1) the dissident groups, (2) the crowd, (3) the subversive manipulators, (4) the internal security forces, and (5) the general population of the community.

The internal security forces are usually composed of: (1) civilian police forces, (2) military forces, and (3) paramilitary forces. The control of crowds and civil disturbances is performed by one or any combination of these forces.

The communities concerned play an important part in civil disturbances. By direct and indirect means their citizens exert an influence upon the other

major participants, causing them to alter their behavior in conforming and nonconforming ways.

## THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF SUBVERSIVE MANIPULATION

The primary goal of the subversive is the achievement of political power. He accomplishes this through a variety of strategies. He attempts to alienate people from the government. He instigates and manages civil disturbances in order to create social disorder.

The organization and planning for the subversive instigation of collective civil violence generally follow four common phases: (1) the precrowd phase, (2) the crowd phase, (3) the civil disturbance phase, and (4) the post civil disturbance phase.

In the precrowd phase long-range activities include recruiting, training personnel, and selecting target groups within the population. Short-range activities include planning for a particular disturbance. Subversive elements engage in preparing propaganda communications, acquiring and storing arms and supplies, establishing routes of escape, and preconditioning the target groups of the community in order to exert a maximum amount of influence on their behavior before, during, and after the civil disturbance.

During the crowd phase activities include assembling the crowd, creating or capitalizing upon a precipitating event, and employing mob management techniques such as proper deployment of subversive personnel throughout the crowd. Once a crowd is formed, one or more agitators arouse or increase hostility and excitement and direct the emotional crowd toward activities which are helpful to the subversive cause and which will expand into a widespread civil disturbance.

When the civil disturbance phase is underway, emotional excitement is maintained by various means. "Cheerleaders" chant slogans and songs. Booster incidents, including looting, are initiated. Bank holdups and attacks on public



buildings are made, with special efforts to seize radio stations, other communications facilities, and utilities.

Martyrs are particularly effective as a focus for sustaining destructive activity, and if attacks on internal security forces fail to produce martyrs, the subversives may even kill a member of the crowd.

Counterpolice tactics geared to disrupt police communications and otherwise hinder the internal security forces are carried out. The hostility of the crowd is often directed toward the internal security forces to such an extent that the original reason for a demonstration is forgotten.

When the disturbance begins to subside and the post civil disturbance phase begins, several techniques are employed to maintain the interest and emotional excitement of the population. Attempts are made to promote a general strike in protest against the government in which the exploitation of martyrs often figures prominently. Such strikes can interrupt vital services and thereby affect the entire population of a community. The earlier seizure of public utilities may be an important element of success in bringing the strike about.

Appeals are disseminated, using radio broadcasts if possible, to increase social disorganization and fear. Appeals are made to all dissidents to join in a united front against the government.

The government is usually presented with demands which are impossible to meet. The intent is to force the government to appear uncompromising, thereby weakening the respect and confidence of the population. Original issues are distorted and enlarged into general antigovernment issues. Subversives customarily insist on complete replacement of existing governmental authority.

#### INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES COUNTERMEASURES

The goal of the internal security forces is the maintenance or reestablishment of public confidence, law, and order. They wish to prevent or control

civil disturbances. The tactics used depend upon the resources available. The resources available can be more effectively utilized and countermeasures improved if certain considerations are made in planning for the prevention and control of subversive instigated demonstrations and riots. Among these considerations are (1) the type and characteristics of the crowd and the similarities and differences among the individuals who compose it, (2) the probability of panic or riot within the crowd, (3) the psychological and physical components of force, (4) the emotional factors involved, (5) critical physical and terrain features of the community such as access routes to critical police control points, and (6) the legal aspects of the riot control situation. Each phase is characterized by specific activity on the part of the internal security forces.

During the precrowd phase the internal security forces experience some difficulty because the subversives take advantage of democratic customs, values, and laws. Therefore some subversive activity is clearly not in violation of existing legal statutes. Subversive dissident groups and nonsubversive dissident groups sometimes employ similar methods and techniques, further complicating the situation.

The maintenance of law and order must be selective in character, since there are seldom enough resources to perform the required mission. The civilian police forces are placed under organizational stress when they are required to assume the added responsibility of combating subversion. Manpower to perform tasks vital to the collection of intelligence information (such as surveillance and infiltration of subversive groups) and the money to pay informers are difficult to provide.

The internal security forces during this period attempt to adjust their orientation, training, planning, and operational posture to meet the challenge of the subversives. In the precrowd phase and all subsequent phases the collection and evaluation of intelligence information remain critical functions.

Crowd behavior in the crowd phase is difficult to predict because of emotional contagion which makes crowds vulnerable to two types of social turbulence, riot and panic. The planned subversive use of agitators, riot leaders, and other mob management personnel adds another dangerous and unpredictable dimension to the crowd control situation.

Crowd control activity has as its objective preventing the crowd from becoming a mob. To do this it uses crowd control measures such as surveillance, psychological deterrents, and negotiations with formal and informal dissident group leaders. Physical force may be required to apprehend agitators or to disperse the crowd.

Once the crowd has started to riot, control techniques other than use of force are difficult to employ. Public opinion must be considered in deciding how much force to use. Those means which seem reasonable to the internal security forces may seem unreasonable to the members of the crowd and community concerned.

In coping with the civil disturbance phase, internal security forces attempt to restore order as rapidly as possible with the minimum use of force. The control of looting, arson, and other acts of vandalism and the control of snipers and other armed members of the crowd under conditions of emotional excitement and planned agitation often require the internal security force having the primary responsibility for the maintenance of law and order to request assistance from the other internal security forces available.

The community's desire for information about the situation is met by using all available means of communication. Continued effort is made to reestablish contact with leaders of dissident groups. The professional conduct of the internal security forces is maintained so that the public confidence within the community will be adversely affected to a minimum extent. Emergency legal provisions such as prohibitions against congregation and the enforcement of a

curfew may be imposed to aid the internal security forces in the performance of their mission.

In the post civil disturbance phase, after the rioting has been brought under control, the internal security forces are primarily interested in maintaining the reestablished control. During this period the subversive manipulator is attempting to prevent the situation from returning to normal. This intensifies the danger that the civil disturbance will flare up again in the same community or spread to other communities. Prohibitions imposed upon the community, such as martial law and ill-timed acts of punishment, may arouse new feelings of hostility.

Reestablishing and maintaining working relationships with dissident groups after an outburst of crowd hostility may bring about an atmosphere of reduced anxiety which is conducive to the exchange of ideas between dissident members of the community and community administrators. Within this atmosphere complaints of dissidents or other members of the community are frequently based upon belief rather than fact. If the community administrators are aware of this they pay attention to these complaints and thereby contribute to maintaining community tensions at a low level. If complaints are ignored, new antagonisms frequently develop.

The realistic evaluation of civil disturbances and the effective use of this information is one of the most important countermeasures available to the internal security forces.

## CONCLUSIONS

The conceptual framework developed in this report is concerned with the phases of a civil disturbance and the classification of the participants within the community context. The application of this conceptual framework to theoretical and operational information reveals that there is a substantial amount of

consistency and compatibility in each dimension of the conceptual framework for information regarding community conflicts, civil disturbances, and subversive manipulation.

However, at this point in the study of civil disturbances and the development of operational procedures one finds that there are some points of difference among social scientists. There are also points of contention among operational personnel. Social scientists are in disagreement as to the necessary and sufficient conditions under which civil disturbances occur.<sup>1</sup> Operational personnel disagree on the issue of force versus persuasion in controlling civil violence.<sup>2</sup>

These differences may be resolved by conducting additional research in the following areas:

- (1) Refinement of the conceptual framework.
- (2) Analysis of empirical data presently available.
- (3) Case studies of subversive manipulation of civil disturbances in the different phases of insurgency.
- (4) Cross-cultural comparisons and analyses of case studies.
- (5) Utilization of the further refined conceptual framework for studying the prediction of civil disturbances.

Investigations in these areas can provide answers to questions which are vital in an age when subversive manipulation of crowds and civil disturbances appears to be an integral part of attempts to illegally achieve political power and when such attempts are becoming more frequent and widespread.

## INTRODUCTION

Historically, periods of rapid social transition have been characterized by sporadic outbursts in some sections of the population.<sup>3</sup> Man in all civilizations has engaged in dramatic and episodic behavior such as riot and revolution.<sup>4</sup>

The Greek city-states were finally destroyed by class warfare which was characterized by extensive rioting. The Roman Empire was often the scene of civil disturbances created by riotous mobs. Rioting by slaves was quite common, and often these hostile outbursts developed into full-scale revolts. A continuous social struggle took place between the common people and the ruling class. In the Roman provinces, the indigenous people frequently expressed their resistance to the plundering administrative methods of the Roman governors by rioting. In Asia Minor, mobs of city dwellers attempted to foment social revolutions against the authority of Rome. In Alexandria, the capital of Egypt, rioting accompanied Jewish pogroms.<sup>5</sup>

In the feudal society of the Middle Ages, private quarrels between the armed retainers maintained by the feudal lords could not be completely suppressed; therefore the right of private war had to be allowed to these retainers, whose arms were the only force which supported the state. Peasant rioting near the end of the Middle Ages, however, was not viewed with such tolerance. These riots were regarded as a threat to the existing social order and were considered as treason. The spirit behind peasant riots throughout Europe appeared to be influenced by both religious and social factors. During the 16th century in England, civil disturbances ranged from minor riots against the ruling class to small civil wars of such intensity that they had to be suppressed by foreign mercenaries.<sup>6</sup>

The industrial revolution which took place in Europe after the mid-18th century changed somewhat the problem of civil disturbances. Previously the rioters had been peasants; now the participants were city laborers. During the early period of the industrial revolution, the hostility of the rioters was directed toward the machines, which they blamed for the reduction of labor forces, and against the rising upper urban middle class who owned the machines. The peasant riots and the riots between rival families and rival guilds had not been characterized by senseless destruction, but in the large cities there were criminal classes who had everything to gain and little to lose by participating in riots.

In the 17th century, gangs were able to flourish in London because of the breakdown of the police system. The military was called upon to maintain law and order, but a magistrate who called on the military stood a good chance of being sentenced to hang if he were subjected to the blind rage of a popular jury. For the same reason, the military was reluctant to answer calls for assistance.<sup>7</sup>

At the time of the famous Gordon anti-Catholic riots in London in 1780, the city remained in the hands of the rioters for a week. In 1819 serious rioting erupted in Manchester among about 50,000 people who had gathered to insist on parliamentary reform. In an attempt to control the disturbance, the cavalry charged the gathering, inflicting numerous casualties. This affair is known as the Manchester Massacre. During the famous Bristol riots of 1830, about 100 people were killed or wounded. Subsequent rioting in England, such as the Trafalgar Square riots of 1888 and the Featherstone riots of 1893-94,<sup>8</sup> were less serious by comparison.

During the turbulent period of the French Revolution, riots were commonplace in France and since that time have not been infrequent. Anticlericalism, royalism, anarchism, and syndicalism have all been influential in rioting in

France since the French Revolution. Militant labor movements have been responsible for great industrial riots in Europe, exemplified by those which occurred in Milan in 1898, Sicily in 1883-94, and Spain in 1909. Many of the riots which have taken place in Europe since the French Revolution have been political in character and have been the initial social turbulence which has preceded revolution.<sup>9</sup>

During the colonial period there were few riots in the British colonies in America, but during and after the Revolutionary War the situation changed. There was a violent riot in Baltimore in 1812. In the 1830's, there was a series of riots in the United States. Boston witnessed a violent civil disturbance in 1837. Fire companies composed mostly of English-Americans fought Irish-Americans in the streets. In Philadelphia, Negro riots which erupted in 1838 were responsible for substantial loss of life and property damage. Before the outbreak of the Civil War, abolitionist riots were common.<sup>10</sup>

During the 1870's, a series of railroad strikes took place. In 1886 the Haymarket riot took place in Chicago. Through the early part of the 20th century race riots and strike riots continued to erupt upon the scene. The beginning of the economic depression in 1929 introduced a period of strikes and other economic disturbances. The Bonus March occurred during the last year of the Hoover administration when veterans of World War I congregated in Washington for the purpose of demanding a bonus payment for participation in the war. During this period demonstrations in the Midwest against mortgage foreclosures also resulted in riots.<sup>11</sup>

There were racial riots during World War II, with two of the most serious occurring in Detroit, Michigan,<sup>12</sup> during the summer of 1943 and in New York City during the same year.<sup>13</sup> Labor unrest continued during the post World War II period.



The social situation which led to the 1954 Supreme Court decision on school desegregation and subsequent decisions in the field of civil rights ushered in an era of demonstrations and racial turbulence both in the northern and the southern regions of the United States. Strikes and labor violence continued sporadically. During the summer of 1964 riots took place in seven northern cities. These riots did not involve whites versus Negroes in the accepted sense of a race riot. Rather they appeared to consist of hostile outbursts of segments of the population of specific Negro communities located in large northern metropolitan areas.<sup>14</sup>

The advent of the political, social, and economic instability that followed World War II and the emergence of many former colonies as independent nations have resulted in civil disturbances becoming a widespread, rather common phenomenon of the post World War II period; riots have occurred in almost every geographical area and in almost every country of the world.

The recognition of the fact that crowds and civil disturbances can be subversively manipulated appears to be as old as the history of riots.<sup>15</sup> Some indication of this recognition is available from reviewing the general provisions of the law concerned with riots across history. It is possible to distinguish two legal concepts of riot. It appears that in both, the mob character of the offense is recognized. However, under one, a riot is an aggravated form of resistance to or attack upon public authorities, the aggravation lying in the mob character of such attack or resistance. Under the other, riot is an aggravated form of breach of the peace, the aggravation being in the mob character of the breach. Either type of offense may be qualified by the number of persons who are involved or by the possession of arms as well as by other circumstances.<sup>16</sup>

The laws concerning riotous offenses, regardless of the name under which they really appear, include many of those forms of assault upon public tranquillity which are short of treason. During critical periods in the rise of

organized states, there is an inclination toward confusing the two and treating all riot as treason, at least as it concerns the ringleaders or instigators.<sup>17</sup>

In Roman law the crime of riot was classified as seditio. Although the exact meaning of the term is not clear, it included the instigation of an insurrection against public authority and also participation in a riotous assembly which was directed against either public authority or private persons.<sup>18</sup>

The law of the early Middle Ages regarding riots was comparatively mild. In the Germanic codes this mildness was reflected by the fact that even the leaders were punishable only by monetary fines. The fines were even lighter in the German and Italian towns of the 13th and 14th centuries. The involvement of firearms and the size of the mob were important factors in the Italian towns.<sup>19</sup>

Laws enacted later, which were based upon Roman law, were more harsh in the treatment of rioters, and Italian instigators of riots were subjected to the sword. Later German law, although it assimilated Roman law, recognized the crime of simple sedition in cases involving riots.<sup>20</sup>

The English state made the king's peace the focal point of criminal public law and was quick to treat riot as treason. In the 16th and 17th centuries, some riots (such as laborers seeking to increase their wages) were considered as war against the king. Future development of the English common law considered a riot to be a misdemeanor consisting of a tumultuous disturbance of the peace by an assembly consisting of three or more persons. The awareness of the possibilities of manipulation is reflected in a further provision in which an assembly is unlawful if it meets for a purpose that will cause fear and violence.<sup>21</sup>

Most of the legal codes of continental Europe treat a riot not as an aggravated breach of the peace but as an attack upon public authorities. The German and French codes differ enough to be considered two subgroups of continental law. There need be no fixed number of participants under the German law.

which regards riot as a mob crime against public authority even though it stipulates that the leaders and instigators should be punished rather severely. The French law considers riots as qualified cases of the crime of resistance to public authority. <sup>22</sup>

Historically and conceptually, the foundation of the American legal system is the common law of England. But the statutes relative to rioting differ from state to state. <sup>23</sup>

That the subversive manipulation of crowds and civil disturbances has long been recognized can be substantiated by numerous historical examples. Those in power have usually assumed that the rioters had no worthwhile aspirations and could be motivated to activity only by the promise of reward from outside agitators or conspirators. Until the deeper aspirations of the poor began to be investigated their periodic rebellions and riots were often attributed to the manipulation of a political opponent or a "hidden hand." This attitude has been so popular in history that it has been shared by all authority, regardless of whether the governing elite was aristocratic, middle class, conservative, liberal, or revolutionary. <sup>24</sup>

Sir Robert Walpole, the King's Chief Minister, attributed the riots of 1736 in England to a Jacobite conspiracy. Some of the Chief Minister's agents spoke suspiciously of the "high church" and "popish priests." It was common in England in the 18th century for one party to accuse the other of "raising a mob." During the course of the French Revolution, both the Royalists and their opponents leveled the charge of mob manipulation when it appeared convenient to do so. <sup>25</sup>

Since World War II internal subversion has been a frequent means of attaining political power. Although the methods of subversive manipulation, specifically of crowds and civil disturbances, may bear a Communist stamp, they have been utilized by many groups throughout history in the pursuit of political power.

It is evident that riots are as old as recorded history and that the laws designed to control these social disturbances have varied as to both historical period and the country involved.

## I. THE SUBVERSIVELY MANIPULATED CIVIL DISTURBANCE

### THE COMMUNITY CONTEXT

Society is the interaction of people in an organized collectivity. Man lives his life as a member of society and is continually under its influence. Because many societies are large and highly complicated groupings of people it is practical to use a smaller unit of analysis in studying subversively manipulated civil disturbances.<sup>26</sup> Societies are composed of communities, and communities themselves are divided into smaller collectivities: organizations, institutions, and work, family, and friendship groups.<sup>27</sup> It appears that in many ways civil disturbances are community-specific, in that no two communities are characterized by identical sets of circumstances.

There are abundant sources of information concerning conflict in the community, but very little has been written about subversively manipulated civil disturbances at this level, although it is the community which is initially threatened and which must therefore initiate countermeasures in its own self-interest. Using the community as the unit of analysis, one may consider the dynamics of community conflict, the characteristics of crowds and civil disturbances, and the workings of subversive elements at the community level, and on the basis of this information construct means of identifying and guidelines for controlling subversively manipulated civil disturbances.

Subversive manipulation is aimed not so much at seizing existing power, but at destroying and recreating it. Thus the subversive seeks to arouse hostility and, having aimed it at existing authority—most often as represented by the police—he then unleashes it, intending that the disorganization of the

community will ultimately lead to its destruction as an enduring, cooperating group and that the destruction of many such communities will lead to the ultimate collapse of the society which they compose.

## COMMUNITY CONFLICT

Community conflicts, once they have begun, resemble one another markedly,<sup>28</sup> and the subversive seeks to capitalize on his knowledge of the common processes involved. He will seek to identify the dissident groups in the community, to unite them against the existing power structure by skillfully aggravating and blending their grievances, and finally to ignite them into civil disturbance. The initial issues of controversy will undergo significant changes, specific issues will give way to general issues, and new grievances will arise. In order to increase the solidarity among members and to gain new members, these new grievances must be devoid of potential for disrupting the unity of the dissident groups, they must be "onesided" in that they allow response in one direction only, and they must be controversial enough to gain the attention of hitherto uninvolved members of the community. General charges of governmental inefficiency, dishonesty, or brutality may serve these purposes. Few people approve of such activity, and such general charges cannot be specifically disproved.<sup>29</sup>

Having sown the seeds of such dissension, the subversive intends that disagreement, nurtured by rumor and slander, will sprout antagonism, and that antagonism will yield a harvest of civil strife.

## CIVIL DISTURBANCE: THE PROBLEM

Civil disturbances include group demonstrations, rioting, and other collective disorders. Such disturbances carry the potentiality for disrupting public safety, law, and order. In situations characterized by the presence of

subversive manipulators such a potentiality warrants intensive scrutiny and thorough preparation for effective counteraction. Since subversive manipulators employ systematic techniques in exploiting civil disturbances, such techniques may be systematically studied. Since such techniques are identifiable and consistent, a thorough understanding of them affords means of effectively thwarting them.

## THE PARTICIPANTS

The participants in the subversively manipulated civil disturbance can be identified as follows:

- (1) The dissident groups.
- (2) The subversive manipulators.
- (3) The crowd.
- (4) The internal security forces.
- (5) The general population of the community.

The general population, though not an active participant in the same sense as the others, can nonetheless influence the course of events and be influenced by them.

### Dissident Groups

The dissident groups are any cohesive groups having real or imaginary grievances against the existing community order. These include both subversive and nonsubversive dissident groups, with the latter being a potential tool of the former.

### Subversive Manipulators

The subversive manipulators are those who attempt to destroy a legally constituted government through the manipulation of other individuals and groups. In order to be effective, skill at manipulation must be augmented by knowledge

of the target community, for it is necessary to identify dissident groups and learn their grievances in order to wake up hostility and set it against governing authority.

### **The Crowd**

In order to have a riot, one must raise a crowd. A crowd is a temporary congregation of a large number of persons; there are several types of crowds and several reasons why they congregate.<sup>30</sup>

A large number of people in a shopping center is a "physical" crowd. A "psychological" crowd is characterized by the people having a common focus of interest, and may be "casual" in that its interest is short-lived, or "intentional" in that its attention lasts for an extended period of time.<sup>31</sup>

A distinction useful to internal security forces in deciding on counter-measures is whether the crowd is spontaneous, conventional, or planned. The spontaneous crowd gathers because of some exciting event—an accident, a fight, a fire. The conventional crowd assembles at a selected meeting place for a specific occasion—a sporting event, parade, etc. The planned crowd differs from conventional crowds in that it is usually formed for the purpose of protesting: examples of planned crowd activities are strikes or demonstrations.<sup>32</sup> A crowd becomes a mob when, under the stimulus of intense excitement or agitation, those within it lose their sense of reason and respect for law and follow leaders in lawless acts.<sup>33</sup>

### **The Internal Security Forces**

The civil police and the military and paramilitary forces constitute the internal security forces. In most instances, the local civil police are the first forces to deal with a civil disturbance, although additional forces are called in if the disturbance is not quickly brought under control.



## **The General Population**

The primary participants in the drama of the subversive manipulation of civil disturbances are drawn from the population concerned. The remainder of the population is like an audience—but a very special audience which can influence the sequence of events by joining or supporting the dissident groups or the internal security forces, or by exerting political pressure on the power structure of the community or larger governmental divisions of the nation concerned.

If it is apparent that the government is too stable for social disorder to achieve political power for the subversive elements in the immediate future, then the long-range propaganda effect of civil disturbances upon the population audience is considered, the objective being to alienate as many individuals and groups from the government as possible.

## **THE PHASES**

Just as the participants may be identified, the tactical phases of the civil disturbance are also identifiable:

- (1) The precrowd phase is the preparatory time prior to the gathering of a crowd when agitation is below the surface and no precipitating event has occurred which would result in the congregating of a crowd.
- (2) The crowd phase is that time when, as the result of events, grievances, or agitation, a crowd has gathered.
- (3) The civil disturbance phase is that time when the crowd has developed into an unruly mob and social disorder prevails.
- (4) The post civil disturbance phase begins when social order has been restored.

Patterns of behavior on the part of the participants can be seen to vary from phase to phase.

## CONSIDERATIONS

How can one tell whether a civil disturbance is subversively manipulated? Ruling elite groups throughout history have tended to believe that civil disturbances were subversively manipulated whether they were or not, and little attempt has been made to distinguish between legitimate dissidents and those seeking the illegal overthrow of the government. Making such a determination is difficult; the subversive attempts to take on the protective coloration of the nonsubversive group he is trying to exploit, events move swiftly, and governmental authority must act on the basis of its knowledge of the moment, within the framework of the laws and values of the society which is under attack. The subversives are not hampered by this latter limitation, and furthermore, they have the initiative: they pick the time and place of action. Internal security forces countermeasures have been largely limited to reaction to an existing crisis.

In order to be able to distinguish a subversively manipulated civil disturbance from a legitimate demonstration, and in order to respond more effectively to subversively manipulated civil disturbances when they do occur, it is useful to know the form of such disturbances—which we have discussed in this chapter—as well as the strategy and tactics of such disturbances in action, which we shall discuss in the next chapter.

## II. THE STRATEGY OF SUBVERSION AND THE TACTICS OF THE SUBVERSIVE MANIPULATION OF CIVIL DISTURBANCES

Subversive strategy has long-range objectives and includes both planning and operational phases. Tactics are the means of achieving the more limited subgoals. The primary strategic goal of internal subversion is to destroy existing power and to fill the void thus created with the subversives' own power structure. A vital element of this strategy is the manipulation of civil disturbances so as to create the social disorder necessary to weaken governmental authority, with the hope of ultimately destroying it.<sup>34</sup>

In the overall strategy this instrument offers the subversives a formidable weapon. For example, insurgents have a difficult time operating militarily in large urban areas because governments maintain large forces in these areas. The instigated civil disturbance offers insurgents the capability of creating violence and confusion in metropolitan areas. Recurring and sustained rioting can tie down internal security units which might be operating in other areas.

Subversive organizations conform to generally known patterns. Most subversive movements have a dedicated hard core of activists who are committed on the basis of an ideological attachment to the rightness of the cause. But not all subversives are committed to ideals. In all societies there are those who naturally array themselves against the status quo, who are rebels even before they have a cause. More recruits are obtained by exploiting the dissatisfaction and frustration implicit in specific cleavages in the population.

## **THE TACTICAL PHASES OF SUBVERSIVE MANIPULATION**

The division of the subversively manipulated civil disturbance into four tactical phases—

- . the precrowd phase
- . the crowd phase
- . the civil disturbance phase
- . the post civil disturbance phase

—facilitates a systematic analysis of the specific behavior of the subversive manipulators and offers a framework in which appropriate countermeasures may be suggested.

### **The Precrowd Phase**

In this report the precrowd phase is defined as the preparatory period prior to the crowd phase when agitation is below the surface and no precipitating event has occurred which would result in the congregating of a crowd.

#### **Building the Organization**

In the precrowd phase the subversive elements are primarily concerned with developing an organizational structure to assist in translating plans into action. Lenin maintained that organizing a network of agents for the rapid and correct distribution of literature accounted for the greater part of the work of preparing for a demonstration or uprising.<sup>35</sup>

#### **Training**

Selected individuals may be given special training in the subversive manipulation of crowds. They may be taught how to construct barricades, conduct street fighting, mobilize city dwellers and plant workers, develop a local strike

into a general strike, or a general strike into a city uprising, and how to develop these into a national uprising. <sup>36</sup> In addition to local people, outside specialists may be brought in to direct the activities. <sup>37</sup>

#### Selection of a Population Target

In Communist terms, the essential characteristic of the mass is its vulnerability to manipulation. A group that is not susceptible to manipulation, at least after some preparation, is not qualified to be considered a part of the masses. The number, then, is not the determining factor of a mass, although the larger the group the more likely it is to be susceptible to manipulation. Dissident target groups within the community are selected primarily for their potential for bringing about community conflict or increasing its intensity. Dissident groups are identified by common interests; they may be ethnic minorities, labor groups, farmers, and so on. They are selected because they offer the greatest potential for covert manipulation. The subversive counts upon the fact that attention can be centered on bread-and-butter issues rather than on complicated ideological sensitivities, for these are the issues which lead people to action. <sup>38</sup> Agents plan moves to infiltrate these groups. They seek membership in formal organizations, clubs, or any associations which would give them access to the potentially dissident segment of the community. <sup>39</sup>

#### Communication

Communication is important in both the planning and action phases of subversive operations. Information designed to stimulate frustration and dissatisfaction may be disseminated to the population.

The desired change in attitude of the members of the target groups is usually accomplished through distribution of selected communications designed to increase anxiety and emotional stress. Clandestinely published newspapers

and bulletins provide means of accomplishing this objective. Also, conversations, radio broadcasts, and telephone calls are used.

### Supplies

A subversive group needs certain specific supplies and equipment. Printed materials require printing devices and paper. If they are brought in from another country, their entry may be illegal, and storage space is required until the appropriate time for distribution. Arms, munitions, and other items may be required. An account of the anti-American riot in Bogota, Colombia, on April 10, 1948, indicated that the planners had stored arms and explosives in 17 houses.<sup>40</sup>

In recent riots, handguns, rifles, and Molotov cocktails have been employed. The rifle has been particularly useful for creating additional chaos by killing or wounding members of the crowd or of the internal security forces from relatively safe distances. Rifles, materials for making Molotov cocktails, explosives, and other weapons such as clubs and lengths of pipe are usually acquired and stored prior to the crowd phase. The same is true of handbills, signs, armbands, and banners.<sup>41</sup>

### Routes of Escape

Arrangements are usually made for members of the subversive organization to escape from the proposed area of the civil disturbance. Routes of escape with prearranged hiding places are established.

### Preconditioning

To instigate demonstrations or strikes, the subversives who have infiltrated such organizations as labor unions, farmers' cooperatives, religious groups, and youth groups identify legitimate grievances and try to determine the language and terms which are used by these groups. They then carry out campaigns directed at the general public or specific target groups such as political parties,

professional organizations, student groups, or any group which may be vulnerable or recruitable for the demonstration. They begin a constant repetition of chosen themes to insure that at the crucial moment these themes will be recognized and responded to by the crowd. They try to personalize the enemy and direct aggressions toward some person, symbol, or object. By concentrating on local and specific grievances with repetitive agitation prior to the proposed demonstration or meeting, they are able to condition the group to phrases and slogans to which they will later react under conditions of emotional stress.<sup>42</sup>

### The Crowd Phase

The manipulation of crowd behavior is the primary objective in creating a civil disturbance. In this connection, the various reasons why people gather in crowds must be understood. Organizations meet at regularly scheduled times; special events—such as sports events or political rallies—attract crowds of people; environmental factors—certain times of the day, week, year—are more conducive to the gathering of crowds. An FBI report of the riots occurring in the United States during the summer of 1964 indicates that in seven out of nine incidents, rioting started on either Friday, Saturday, or Sunday, and that in two instances it was influenced by a national holiday. On hot summer weekend nights crowds customarily gather in congested areas of large industrial and commercial cities for relaxation, drinking, dancing, and talking. One of the riots analyzed started at a street dance.<sup>43</sup>

### Assembling the Crowd

The crowd is an indispensable element in the civil disturbance. Manipulators prefer to work with crowds composed of individuals who have been pre-conditioned to respond in a certain way to a set of built-in grievances.

The crowd may be assembled from organizations, informal gatherings, or hired demonstrators. Mass organizations can be infiltrated and their members induced to participate in a series of strikes or demonstrations which can be turned into armed rallies and finally into a general strike. Labor unions and other organizations whose rules call for sanctions against members who do not comply with the decisions of the organization can be infiltrated, and once the decision has been made for a strike or demonstration pressure can be brought to bear upon the members to force them to assemble at a designated location.

Demonstrations can be raised at parades, street parties, dances, or during normal rush hour periods. Manipulators turned crowds of students and other onlookers into a mob during Vice President Richard Nixon's trip to Venezuela in 1958. Nixon's car was pelted with eggs and tomatoes and eventually attacked by rioters wielding jagged cans, heavy rocks, and clubs. The traffic jam which permitted the car to be attacked in the first place was premeditated. Two trucks collided and the drivers walked away leaving the large traffic jam which stopped the car. The street was packed with banner-carrying youngsters primed for action.<sup>44</sup>

Hired demonstrators may be used alone or in conjunction with an assembled crowd. In the Venezuelan riots, party agents went into areas where criminal elements lived and hired as many as they could, arming them with long wooden clubs and iron bars. Many top Communists from countries around Venezuela converged on Caracas at that time and later Gustavo Machado, the Venezuelan Communist leader, admitted organizing the demonstration.<sup>45</sup>

The demonstration which met Press Secretary James Hagerty on his 1960 trip to Japan had been prepared by organizers who hired students at \$3 a day and who had arranged for labor federation workers of the Sohyo to be given a half day's wages to participate in the demonstration. In addition, the agitators



had hired so many applicants from the unemployment offices that police were able to predict the large demonstration.<sup>46</sup>

### The Precipitating Event

The precipitating event which results in the formation of a crowd may really have happened or it may be a fabrication of the agitator; and in either case, a lie is often involved: if the event is factual, it may be naturally distorted as it passes from person to person by word of mouth, and the agitator may capitalize on this by distorting it even further to fit the issues and the purposes of the time. The precipitating event can be a report of police brutality, the killing of a member of the crowd, or some symbolic act such as the desecration of a flag. In any case the effectiveness of the incident depends a great deal on the way in which it is communicated.

### Mob Management Techniques

Although the Communist Party of Iraq in the militant period of 1948-50 was a small minority, it succeeded, by successful mob management, in creating the impression of large numbers and great support. The Communist elements were organized into an external command, well removed from the activity, which could observe the demonstration, and an internal command located in the crowd and responsible for directing the demonstration. There were also bodyguards for the internal command, messengers who carried orders between the internal and external commands, guards to rescue Communists who were arrested by police, and banner carriers who switched from slogans expressing general grievances to those reflecting direct Communist propaganda at the appropriate time. The cheering sections consisted of special demonstrators who had rehearsed the slogans and chants and the order in which they were to be raised.<sup>47</sup>

### The Agitator

After the crowd has been formed, the agitator assumes a significant role. His function has been described as bringing to flame the smoldering resentment of his listeners through emotional appeals and then giving social sanction to their actions. The agitator in the crowd plays upon the audience's suspicion of things they do not understand. He may point out that in the midst of material abundance the members of the crowd do not get their proper share. He generally points to a premonition of disasters to come and plays upon the fears of individuals and the uncertainty of life in the community. The agitator emphasizes that the politicians and the police are representatives of government and alludes to fraud, deception, and falsehoods. The agitator seldom invents issues, nor does he have to, since his appeals are vague and he plays upon the basic emotions of fear and insecurity. The agitator seldom justifies his facts nor does he need to, since his themes are emotional and common to all men.<sup>48</sup>

### The Riot Leader

After the crowd has been emotionally aroused, some event must set it in motion. Often the crowd begins its riotous activity by responding to any leader who merely shouts, "Follow me, let's go!" Under these conditions the crowd rapidly becomes a mob possessing tremendous energy and a capacity for destructive action. The internal command assumes the leadership role if a leader does not arise from the crowd, and the probability of achieving the desired results is then increased. The event which sets the crowd in motion may, like the precipitating incident that brought it together, be either factual or fabricated.

In small groups there is face-to-face communication and interaction. In large groups, however, communications come through second- and third-hand

sources. This is conducive to the spirit of rumor. It has been said that no riot ever occurs without rumors to incite, accompany, and intensify the violence.<sup>49</sup> Rumors of this type tend to mobilize collective action. They may be communicated through gestures, interpersonal conversations, or mass media. They may be triggered by an actor who sets an example by what he does and spontaneously becomes the leader of a group or they may be planned by a subversive organization which moves in to capitalize upon unrest.<sup>50</sup>

Precipitating events give generalized beliefs immediate substance. Beliefs tend to reduce the ambiguity created by the uncertainty of the mob situation. Rumors as they are related to beliefs tend to restructure the ambiguous and uncertain situation and to explain them for the individual who is participating in the crowd. They help to put facts into place.<sup>51</sup>

### The Civil Disturbance Phase

#### Maintaining Emotional Excitement

Once the destructive action of the crowd is under way, the agitator tries to maintain the level of emotional excitement. This can be accomplished in various ways. Cheerleaders can chant rhythmic and inspiring phrases or songs. Slogans can be displayed and banners unfurled. Booster incidents can be created or capitalized upon: a common type of booster activity is the looting of stores and shops. Bank holdups and kidnaping may also be carried out during the chaos. Other acts, such as verbally abusing and stoning the police, that permit the individual to release aggression and hostility against the symbols of authority also increase the emotional involvement. Public buildings are attacked and special efforts are directed at seizing control of communications media. In the Panama riots of 9-12 January 1964, 400 to 500 people threw stones and Molotov cocktails in an assault on the home of Judge Guthrie F. Crowe before they were finally driven away. Later they attacked the railroad station.

Molotov cocktails were used during the rioting and must have been made for this purpose, according to the investigating committee appointed by the International Commission of Jurists, but when, where, and by whom they were made was not disclosed.<sup>52</sup>

### Creation of Martyrs

The creation of a martyr has a sustaining effect upon destructive crowd activity. The first "martyr" may be the fabrication of a clever agitator. Attacks are made upon internal security forces in order to provoke a retaliation. If this fails, a rifle in the hands of a sniper can assure a victim. A Communist organizer and participant revealed that during a demonstration which took place in New York City in the 1930's a member of the crowd had purposely been killed by dropping a paving stone on him from a building; this murder of one of the demonstrators was committed in order to create a martyr for the cause.<sup>53</sup>

### Counterpolice Activity

Police and army counterriot tactics are studied by the planners so that steps can be taken to circumvent them. The avenues of approach that would usually be taken by internal security forces may be blocked with barricades, overturned vehicles, and debris. Attacks upon police stations and their communications systems may serve to disrupt police countermeasures. However, cadres avoid confrontation with the police in order to escape arrest. Cadres are usually guarded by strong-arm squads. Appeals to army or police units not to attack their own countrymen are often utilized. Such appeals are especially effective when there are children, women, war veterans, or students in the front ranks of the crowds.<sup>54</sup> They are often placed there purposely.

### **Post Civil Disturbance Phase**

When the civil disturbance begins to subside the subversive elements use a variety of means to capitalize on the situation.

#### **The 24-hour General Strike**

One way of maintaining the interest and emotional involvement of the population is a 24-hour general strike. Workers, especially those in key industries and utilities, are encouraged to protest against the government by staying away from work for 24 hours. This is time enough to interrupt vital utilities and so affect the entire population. Individuals and property owners are then faced with the dilemma of going about their normal routine and facing potential violence against themselves or staying home for a day. Factory cells incite union members to stay off the job. They seek union sponsorship or usurp authority by making unauthorized announcements or by directly contacting individual members.

#### **The United Front**

To turn specific issues into grievances against the government, the subversives make appeals to all workers, political groups, students, and other dissident groups to join in a united front against the government. Cells in the various factories, districts, zones, and businesses demand that their organizations support the strike in the form of a united front.

#### **Spreading the Violence**

Agitators attempt to capitalize upon the contagion effect of civil disturbances by continuing acts of violence and by creating new incidents in nearby areas. Attacks upon symbols of authority, such as radio stations and the offices of local officials, serve to spread the disorder and increase its intensity. If possible,

radio stations, newspapers, and water and power facilities are seized. Newspapers and radios spread rumors, and subversive control of water and power plants spreads social disorganization and fear. In the Bogota riot of 1948 and in the Bolivian riots of April 1953, appeals were made to workers, peasants, and trade unionists to form armed "people's militias" and correct the "injustices" of the government.<sup>55</sup>

### The Demands

The demands against the government are usually vague and impossible to meet, deliberately framed to portray the position of the government as uncompromising. Original issues, such as higher wages or higher taxes, are now changed to antigovernment demands. Subversives call for a release of political prisoners and for the police and army to join the rioters. It is customary to insist on nothing less than the complete replacement of existing authority. These demands can be articulated in protest meetings that keep the public aroused and involved. Committees are formed in many villages or cities to protest government actions. Every attempt is made to gain the support of notable and respected citizens and lend their names to the protest. The aim is to achieve the propaganda gain of putting the government in a bad light and consequently undermining the people's loyalty to and respect for the existing government.

Whether or not such tactics are effective in all civil disturbances, they are potentially effective, and a knowledge of these tactics is a valuable asset to the internal security forces who must counter the resultant social disorder.

### III. INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES COUNTERMEASURES

#### STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

The struggle for public opinion influences the strategy employed by both internal security forces and subversives. The primary strategic objective of the internal security forces in controlling crowds and civil disturbances is the establishment, maintenance, or reestablishment of public safety, law, and order. Corollary aims are creating or maintaining public respect for authority and diminishing subversive propaganda gains.

Strategic planning and operations require the coordination of various forces. In countries where the civilian police forces have the primary responsibility for maintaining public safety, law, and order, paramilitary and military units traditionally augment or replace civilian police in critical situations stemming from civil disturbances. In countries where the primary responsibility is that of paramilitary or military forces, the civilian police forces render assistance. Strategic planning and operations require the coordination of these various forces.

#### TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Whatever the environment, resources, or situation, certain factors must be carefully considered in tactical planning: the nature of the crowd, the possibility of panic, the use of force or alternatives to the use of force, the emotional factors involved in the interaction of internal security forces and population, and the legal aspects of the riot control situation.

## **The Nature of the Crowd**

During civil disturbances, the attention of the other participants is centered on the crowd. A crowd is usually considered as an entity or group, but for tactical purposes it must also be considered in terms of the individuals who compose it.

### **The Crowd as a Group**

Crowds have been categorized in many ways—according to purpose, social composition, type of leadership, etc. A categorization especially helpful in determining countermeasures is one based on formation, which considers whether the crowd is planned, conventional, or spontaneous. Countermeasures may vary according to the type of crowd.

Another important consideration is the complex problem of determining the amount of subversive influence. In many instances subversive groups or individuals are present in crowds and civil disturbances, but their mere presence may not significantly influence the course of events. Certain vocal groups within the population appear always willing to accord subversive elements much more credit for influencing collective violence than can be reasonably substantiated. On numerous occasions the subversive elements are quite willing to accept credit which makes them appear much more influential than they actually are and thus serves a propaganda purpose.

### **Individuals Composing the Crowd**

While crowds can be described in terms of their unifying characteristics, there appears to be some advantage if, in planning countermeasures and operations, attention is given to the individuals composing the crowds. Some crowd control techniques are very solidly based upon the concern of an individual for



his own safety. For example, the use of chemical agents or high-pressure streams of water causes each individual in the crowd to become interested in his own well-being. This concern becomes the overriding factor in determining his behavior.

Knowledge of the individuals composing the crowd has implications for internal security forces control during all the tactical phases of a civil disturbance. In the collection of intelligence, information is gained from individuals for a variety of reasons—some people inform because of expected favors or monetary reward, some because of enmity toward other people, groups, or organizations, and others because they are motivated by identification with a cause or because they are interested in fair play.

#### Coping with Panic

A complication of crowd control situations is the tendency of crowds to panic. A source on the analysis of panic suggests four factors as characteristically involved.<sup>56</sup>

Perceived threat. This threat can be physical, psychological, or a combination. It is usually regarded as being so imminent that there is no time to do anything except attempt to escape.

Partial entrapment. There is only one or perhaps a limited number of escape routes from a situation dominated by a perceived threat.

Breakdown of the escape route. In this situation, the escape route is blocked, jammed, or overlooked.

Front-to-rear communication failure. The false assumption that an exit is still open leads people at the rear of the mass to exert strong pressure to advance toward it. This often results in people being smothered or trampled to death.

The above-cited analysis states that there is some evidence to support the contention that when people realize that an escape route is actually blocked and that it is not possible to escape they are likely to remain hopeful or else to become apathetic and depressed. The likelihood of panic behavior in this situation is slight.

In a crowd, especially when the mob stage is approached, individuals appear to be acting in concert. When a crowd becomes panic stricken, each individual is quite clearly acting in his own self-interest.

### The Use of Force

The tactical consideration that is perhaps most sensitive to public criticism is the use of force in civil disturbances. Judgment as to the kind and amount of force required to control a civil disturbance usually varies widely within the internal security forces and some general policy regarding it is best established before application is necessary. Observable differences have been noticed in the emphasis given the use of force by different police departments, with some favoring persuasion as opposed to force.<sup>57</sup> Some of the interpersonal behavior involved appears to exert a substantial amount of influence upon crowd situations. For example, it has been suggested that some of the members of the crowd take the cues for their subsequent behavior from the members of the internal security forces.<sup>58</sup> Approaching too close to a person or advancing upon him in a threatening manner may produce a readiness either to flee or to fight. If the compactness of the crowd prevents flight, the result may be physical aggression by the threatened individual or by another sympathetic individual who perceives the threat—perhaps a person located on a rooftop with a supply of bricks and bottles.

### Alternatives to Force

The use of force in the prevention, control, or dispersal of civil disturbances may not always be desirable. It may be effective against spontaneous crowds without organizational affiliations or leadership. However, it is probably not so effective against crowds with formal leadership that can exercise organizational and psychological control of the members of the crowd. The subversive capitalizes on the use of force by the internal security forces against

identifiable segments of the community to create issues which can be used to alienate the people from the government and rally them to antigovernment causes. Several alternatives to the use of physical force to control crowds have been suggested in other research.<sup>59</sup>

There are two situations in which alternatives to physical force may be employed. The first situation is before the crowd has gathered and is based upon advance information. Control may be exercised by changing the situation. Attempts may be made to persuade groups and leaders to employ other means of protest. Action may be taken to reduce the saliency of the issues, thereby lessening the probability of a public demonstration. Prohibitions against congregation in general, or in critical areas, and other restrictive measures may be employed.

The second situation in which the alternatives to force may be employed occurs after a group or crowd has formed but usually before a civil disturbance begins. Here attempts are made to persuade or influence groups of individuals and formal and informal leaders. These psychological alternatives include the show of force and prohibitions such as restraining barriers which deny access to specific critical areas. Another psychological approach is to offer the crowd one or more courses of action that can be engaged in before dispersal. These courses of action may include permission for members of the protest crowd to present grievances.

During one of the demonstrations that took place in Cambridge, Maryland, in 1964, the commanding general of the national guard permitted the demonstrators to sing a song before dispersing. As a result of this concession, the crowd dispersed without force being used.

Permitting a protest crowd to attain some of its objectives or to participate in some activity constitutes a psychological compromise situation, whereas immediate and unconditional dispersal may appear to the crowd and its leaders

as total psychological defeat. Such psychological defeat may further alienate dissident groups and leaders, making them more vulnerable to subversive manipulation.

## EMOTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

The attitude of members of the particular internal security force involved toward the segment of the population from which the crowd is drawn or to the members of the specific crowd is a significant determinant of behavior. Emotional involvement may result in strict and inflexible enforcement of the law. This is especially true in instances where the internal security forces do not identify themselves with the members of the group against whom the action is being taken. It may also result in laxity in law enforcement against members of groups with whom the internal security forces identify or sympathize. In other instances, however, emotional involvement results in vacillation or hesitation to take action.<sup>60</sup> The extra time provided by the vacillation may work to the disadvantage of the maintenance of public safety and to the advantage of collective violence. The existence of strong feelings regarding certain segments of the population and certain kinds of crowds tends to be more predominant among civil police forces and national guard units than among army units and national police units. Local internal security force units, such as the national guard and the civil police, are usually composed of individuals from the immediate area, and they are subject to the social pressures of the local community.

Internal security forces have historically been the target of the aggression of crowds and mobs. This results primarily from the role assigned to internal security forces. They are the visible and accessible extension of governmental authority. The completion of their mission continually demands that they function as a barrier between the crowd and its immediate goals. People become

frustrated when they are in highly emotional states and are denied access to the goals or objectives they desire to obtain. They frequently respond by attacking the barrier, which in this instance is the internal security force. However, there is a distance factor involved in that the emotional excitement of a crowd tends to increase as it physically approaches its goal. Therefore, by operating as a barrier, the internal security forces may in fact control the emotional level of the crowd by not permitting it to come within close distance of its goal—for example, the embassy of a foreign country when the objective is to sack and burn it.

Some of the hostility felt for internal security forces may be channelized by the formation of special riot control police units whose function it is to control civil disturbances. Their mission and method of operation become well known to the public, and they may serve to focus crowd hostility upon themselves, thereby reducing or eliminating crowd hostility toward other police units.

Elite military units such as the military police or paratroops may relieve the generation of hostility toward local police units. Because such organizations are not usually from the area concerned and are well trained, professional, and impartial in the performance of their duties, they apparently do not generate a significant amount of hostility among the population, and, in the event that they do, their subsequent removal from the scene tends to minimize the lingering hostility among the population. In situations characterized by prolonged violence and terror, special military units serve to reduce apprehension and fear among the population because they are not emotionally involved in the community conflict. Perhaps because of local opinions and loyalties, these feelings of relief usually will not be verbalized.

## LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

Because of the closeness of the relationship between those who enforce and uphold the laws and those who make and change the laws, no discussion of the maintenance of internal security would be complete without some consideration of the critical way in which the laws are involved in the overall situation. Because the law reflects cultural values and norms, it has a tendency to become an instrument of the status quo and therefore an instrument for resisting change. In constitutional societies where the law guarantees political liberties such as the right of voluntary association, and restrains the arbitrary use of police power, subversive opponents of the status quo and the system are able to establish and maintain a powerful base of political action. Even though the subversive group can take advantage of the legal structure, it is very difficult for the existing government to justify changing the laws while the potential of the subversive elements for antigovernment violence is still within the control capability of the state; when the subversive elements have gained a potential for the expression of violence which is equal to or greater than that of the state, then changing the law appears to gain precedence over enforcing it.<sup>61</sup>

During the Malayan emergency (1948-1957), after the insurgents had decided to resort to armed terrorism and after they had fomented considerable violence by manipulated civil disturbances, the British Government attempted to aid in the solution of the problem by changing the laws. This was done by instituting emergency regulations. Among the provisions of the regulations were the suspension of the right of habeas corpus, permitting the detention of those suspected of subversive activity for a period of 2 years, and exiling those involved in subversive activities.<sup>62</sup>

An exception to this general pattern was to be found in South Africa, in 1965, where the Government apparently still had the capability of controlling antigovernment violence but had taken emergency action such as outlawing certain political parties and suspending the right of habeas corpus by permitting individuals suspected of subversive activity to be detained for a period of 90 days without formal charges being made. Many activities, such as illegal possession of firearms and demonstrations against government policies, were considered to be subversive. Penalties for acts of subversion had been made very drastic.<sup>63</sup>

One fact stands out clearly in relation to the legal aspects of law enforcement. The internal security forces do not have the power to change the laws; and their behavior in taking actions to control the subversive manipulation of crowds and civil disturbances is usually defined and limited by laws. On the other hand, the internal security forces, by keeping abreast of the situation, can recommend changes in the laws and enactment of emergency measures based upon their evaluation of the probable course of events.

## THE TACTICAL PHASES

The tactical phases of civil disturbance provide a convenient device for exploring some of the problems, objectives, methods, and techniques of the internal security forces.

### The Precrowd Phase

During the precrowd phase, much of the activity engaged in by subversive elements—organizing, planning, preparing literature, etc.—is difficult to detect because it is conducted in secret. At this point, some of the activity engaged in by subversives—joining legal organizations, creating dissatisfaction—is not clearly illegal. The subversive manipulator depends upon accepted customs,

values, and laws, such as the right of peaceful assembly and the right to strike, to assure himself of a crowd which he can exploit.

An additional difficulty is that there are nonsubversive dissident groups who sometimes use methods and techniques similar to those used by subversive groups; there is always danger that these groups may be infiltrated by subversives or that they may be mistakenly identified as subversive.

Another major problem is that the maintenance of public safety, law, and order—especially among civil police organizations—is a selective process. There are seldom enough resources in terms of money and manpower to perform the missions assigned, and some priority for operating must be established. The need to detect and control subversive activity immediately places a civilian police organization under stress, and in many instances the additional responsibility must be undertaken without an increase in resources.

In countering subversive manipulation, the collection of intelligence information which is political in character is inescapable. Some difficulty may be encountered because the customs and values of a community may be averse to the civilian police performing this function.

An emotional identification with one side or the other in community conflict may impede the effective collection of intelligence information. Information available may be prejudged before it is properly evaluated. Care should be taken that such involvement does not influence the official behavior of the civilian police or other internal security forces.

The precrowd phase can be seen in two different aspects: (1) the long-range aspect, when no signs of impending disorder are apparent; and (2) the short-range aspect, when signs of impending disorder exist and, possibly, can be detected by alert security forces trained to recognize them. The objectives during the precrowd phase are: (1) to gain intelligence which would both indicate impending trouble and which would aid in planning to cope with such trouble;



(2) to develop contingency plans; and (3) to maintain public confidence and respect. These objectives are overlapping and interdependent.

Some of the physical features of the community which have been considered in planning countermeasures are: (1) primary and alternate routes of access to critical police control points; (2) areas such as town squares or parks where crowds usually assemble; (3) tall buildings in potential trouble areas; (4) banks and clearinghouses; (5) key utilities such as power plants, waterworks, and gas works; and (6) communications facilities such as radio stations and telephone and telegraph exchanges. Physical features having psychological and symbolic significance, such as statues or memorials to patriots or group heroes, courthouses, and places of detention are also important in tactical and contingency planning by internal security forces.

Three areas of intelligence information are especially important. The police must identify and maintain communication with dissident groups in the community. They must identify and maintain surveillance of subversive elements in the community. Being familiar with the activities of both known subversives and known dissidents can enable the police to detect signs of impending trouble, discriminate between the two in the event of a civil disturbance, and allow for effective planning. A third area of intelligence concerns identifying and maintaining surveillance of known troublemakers and other lawless elements who would be quick to join in and aggravate a potential civil disturbance.

People in crisis situations have a great psychological need for information. Individuals and groups under stress seek information about the situation they are involved in. If communications are not issued by official sources, information is obtained from unofficial sources. Most unofficial information available in situations of this kind is heavily biased. Individuals and groups then selectively determine what information is important or acceptable based upon their personal feelings.

Maintaining public respect is important because the psychological effect of the threat of force is in some instances influenced by the regard that the public has for the internal security force involved. When the threat of force is sufficient and respect for the internal security forces is high, the use of force may not be necessary.

One universal means that the internal security forces have for maintaining public confidence is efficient and impartial enforcement of the law. Another technique is to furnish accurate information to the public about community conflict situations.

During the precrowd phase the internal security forces are in an excellent position to collect intelligence information. Among the ways that may be used are surveillance, informers, and infiltration of subversive organizations. Subversive manipulation of crowds cannot take place without some sort of preparation and communication. A thorough familiarity with the situation and knowledge of the method and operation of subversive manipulators can give the internal security forces the necessary information on which to base plans and countermeasures. With such familiarity, trained forces recognize indicators of subversive manipulation such as the following:

- (1) the entrance of known subversives into the community;
- (2) discovery of or information concerning hidden arms, banners, Molotov cocktails, or propaganda material;
- (3) the circulation of communications with propaganda characteristics, whether by word of mouth, telephone, pamphlet, or other means;
- (4) attempts to hire demonstrators;
- (5) attempts to train and orient agitators or other crowd manipulators;
- (6) information on attempts to arrange for safe houses and routes of escape;
- (7) increases in the expression of verbal hostility toward police by dissident groups and, perhaps in response to this, increase of verbal hostility toward dissident groups by police;
- (8) infiltration of known or suspected subversives into nonsubversive community groups and organizations.

In addition, the use of information contained in police or other records is important at this time. For example, a stranger behaving in a suspicious manner can be identified and checked against local and central files to determine his background and method of operation. Other significant information is collected and added to the files for future use.

The organizational strain under which the civilian police force or paramilitary force has been placed continues to increase as the activity of the subversive elements is stepped up. The precrowd phase is the ideal time to plan and implement organizational adjustment and to develop techniques for the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of political intelligence information. A special intelligence unit may be required within the organization.

Due to the limited resources of civilian police forces, this is the opportune time for establishing and seeking assistance from other government agencies concerned with the same problem. Liaison can be established with other internal security forces as well as with other government organizations such as investigative agencies. This may be done through a committee composed of representatives of the various forces, either on a formal or an informal basis.

The precrowd phase is also the appropriate time for training the internal security forces to cope with any emergency. Such training should be accomplished before signs of impending disturbance are evident.

Establishing and maintaining lines of communication with those individuals and dissident groups who have become involved in past civil disturbances can be accomplished both formally and informally. When lines of communication exist between a dissident group and the internal security forces, there is less chance of community conflict escalating to violence, since the channels may be used for expressing dissatisfaction and exchanging information. The absence or breakdown of these lines of communication has often contributed to civil disturbances.<sup>64</sup>

## The Crowd Phase

The crowd phase presents internal security forces with some of their most critical problems. Crowd behavior which results in rioting and mob behavior is very difficult to predict with any certainty. The terminology used to describe crowd activity gives some indication of the problem. Crowds have been described as "fickle," "irrational," and "spontaneous," and their behavior as "unanticipated" or "surprising."<sup>65</sup>

The emotionality that arises when individuals form a crowd appears to have a self-stimulating or circular effect in that the level of emotionality tends to increase, especially under the influence of agitation.

Crowds are vulnerable to two particular types of social turbulence: panic and riot. Either by itself presents a difficult control problem for the internal security forces. The possibility of both occurring in the same crowd within a relatively short period of time adds to the difficulty of planning and executing countermeasures.

The presence of known subversive individuals in a crowd does not automatically indicate the extent of their involvement or the extent of their influence. If this cause and effect relationship is assumed by the internal security forces, then the subversive elements receive the benefit of prestige and influence to which they are not actually entitled.

The success of the internal security forces in controlling the crowd phase determines whether the civil disturbance takes place. The problem is particularly acute in subversively manipulated crowds because there are a number of actions that the manipulator may engage in to cause riot or panic. False rumors may be circulated. Members of the internal security force may be deliberately attacked in order to provoke retaliatory acts upon members of the crowd. The

primary internal security objective is either to keep the crowd under surveillance and control or to disperse it.

This is a critical time for maintaining contact with the leaders of dissident groups so that channels for expressing grievances and disseminating information can be kept open. Internal security forces capable of handling any emergency which might develop must be available and ready to move into position.

The intelligence objective continues as a priority during the crowd phase. The needed information is essentially of two kinds: that which can be immediately transmitted to the riot control center to be acted upon, and that which will later be of use in evaluating the crowd activity and civil disturbance.

The methods and techniques of crowd control are well established. The difficulty is encountered in determining which techniques are appropriate for the particular crowd and situation involved. The proper selection of techniques plays an important role in whether or not the civil disturbance occurs. There is information available to indicate how some of the various types of crowds previously classified will respond to control measures.

#### Spontaneous Crowd

This type of crowd usually appears without warning because of some exciting event. Examples are crowds which gather at an accident, a fight, or a fire. Frequently the spontaneous crowd is hard to move and easy to aggravate. For instance, in a crowd gathered to watch a fight or an arrest, if those fighting have partisans in the crowd or if a person being arrested has sympathizers among the spectators, the situation can be very hard to handle. If controversial religious, racial, political, or national issues become involved, the preconditions for civil disturbance prevail. This kind of situation immediately places the policemen at the scene on the spot: their actions may determine whether or not collective civil violence ensues. The immediate, unequivocal show of

force in this situation often appears to be to the advantage of the internal security forces.

### **Conventional Crowds**

The conventional crowd assembles at a common meeting place for a pre-planned occasion. Examples of conventional crowds are those which are found at sporting events and parades. The conventional crowd is characterized by predictability of time and place of congregation. There are no leaders, and the participants are usually orderly. However, because of its size, this type of crowd is one of the most difficult to control if agitation or an unforeseen event results in hysteria, panic, or rioting.<sup>66</sup>

The planning and application of countermeasures are difficult because the subversive manipulator has time and knowledge of the situation working to his advantage and is able to choose the precipitating event he will utilize. The best available internal security force procedures for crowds of this type appear to be the collection of intelligence information to determine if subversive elements are going to attempt to instigate civil disturbances, surveillance to determine if there is any manipulation or agitation on the scene, and contingency planning to assure that adequate countermeasures can be applied if needed.

Agitators have behavior patterns which have been identified. These patterns can be observed and reported by trained internal security forces personnel. The agitator concentrates on emotional appeals and attempts to exploit the frustration of his public. His function is described as bringing to flame the smoldering resentment of his listeners through emotional appeals and lending social sanctions to their actions. One effective way of dealing with an agitator is to arrest him for inciting to riot, thereby putting an end to his verbal influence.

The internal security forces must also be alert to identify riot leaders. After the agitator has prepared the crowd, he may lead the riot. If he does not, the riot leader either emerges from the crowd or is planted there by the

subversive manipulator. The appropriate countermeasure in most situations is the removal of the riot leader from the crowd before he has the opportunity to become effective.

#### Planned Protest Crowds

These are crowds which have been carefully organized for the purpose of protesting and which assemble with the assent of participating members. The protest usually takes the form of a strike or a demonstration.

The general opinion of law enforcement officials is that crowds of this type can best be controlled through their leaders. Control is facilitated by maintaining contact with these leaders continuously, beginning in the precrowd phase if possible, or as soon thereafter as practical.

#### The Civil Disturbance Phase

The question of use of force becomes critical during the civil disturbance phase. Once a civil disturbance is underway it is difficult to avoid using force as the primary control measure. Alternatives not usually used or approved of have been employed. For instance, in Vietnam during a Buddhist-Catholic riot in 1964, police sealed off the rioting area and let the riot run its full course of violence and destruction with much loss of life and property. Such actions would be unpopular except under special circumstances.

The use of force is the tactical consideration most sensitive to public criticism. In some instances, certain forceful means available for use in the maintenance of law and order are not employed because of public pressure. The trained police dog, which has both a psychological and physical effect upon persons engaged in civil disturbances, was not extensively used in the riots which took place in the large industrial cities in the United States during the summer of 1964 because of the adverse public opinion which had been created by

the apparent misuse of this means in controlling demonstrations which had occurred in another section of the country.

Individuals who have poor emotional control often join in looting and other acts of vandalism once a riot has started. These individuals obviously are not subversive but can serve the purposes of the manipulator by increasing the general disorder and prolonging the disturbance.

The primary objective of the internal security forces during this phase is to restore order as quickly as possible with a minimum amount of employed force.

The collection of intelligence information remains a priority objective during this phase, especially that concerning the spreading of violence. At this point, standard riot control techniques must be employed.

The priorities of force established by the United States Army may be applied in any order deemed appropriate by the responsible commander and are as follows:

- (1) show of force
- (2) employment of riot-control formations
- (3) employment of water
- (4) employment of chemical agents
- (5) fire by selected marksmen
- (6) full firepower

While these methods have remained very much the same for a long period of time, equipment for use in civil disturbances is continually under development. One new device is the two-handed wooden riot baton. Another is a shock baton, powered by standard flashlight batteries, which delivers an uncomfortable skin-surface shock resembling the sting of a bee. The electric cattle prod has also been utilized to disperse demonstrations and gatherings. Light-weight riot vests have been developed to protect internal security forces against handgun and rifle fire. Photographing the crowd with plainly visible movie cameras is also effective.



Some items recently introduced or under research and development are:<sup>67</sup>

- (1) A device to electrify the body of a vehicle, which will deliver a painful but harmless shock to individuals who touch the vehicle while standing on the ground.
- (2) A means of delivery for particles of ultraviolet marking material. The invisible particles which adhere to an individual's skin and clothing will show up when internal security forces employ a special portable scanner at road blocks or identification points. This technique will aid in identifying participants in civil disturbances after the action has ceased.
- (3) A portable high-pressure system mounted on a vehicle, which will project harmless but painful electric shocks down streams of water.
- (4) Loadings for grenades which will mark and stain participants in civil disturbances with indelible dye. Screening smoke and other irritants, including substances with intolerable odors, can be projected in this manner.
- (5) Vehicular mounted sound projectors emitting variable pitch, high intensity sounds of an almost intolerable volume. It is anticipated that this device will be effective against singing, chanting, slogan-shouting crowds and mobs.
- (6) A vehicular mounted spotlight which flashes with such brilliance that the vision of individuals engaged in civil disturbances is temporarily affected. Lights being developed with similar characteristics may, in addition, be directed toward a given target.
- (7) A tear gas shell for use in the riot-type shotgun, having a range of about 150 yards.
- (8) Projector devices for tranquilizers and soporific materials.

The mere presence of police and military forces sufficient to control a hostile outbreak is not enough to guarantee order: authorities must be willing to employ these forces and must stand firmly behind them.

The recommended countermeasure to cope with looters is prompt and forceful action by the internal security forces. This activity usually ceases when the risk of personal injury and arrest of looters becomes apparent.

Although these devices are useful in physically dispersing crowds and mobs, they also have psychological consequences which are difficult to anticipate. Adverse psychological reaction to these control devices by members of the crowd or the community can afford the subversives an opportunity for propaganda

which may adversely affect the public relations and public confidence of the community. Hostile outbreaks among the population may be encouraged by any "official" sympathy with the disturbance.

There is also the possibility that the internal security forces may overreact to public opinion and reject control devices, methods, and techniques which would actually make a contribution to more effective crowd and mob control.

### **The Post Civil Disturbance Phase**

There is always the danger that civil disturbances—especially those influenced by issues of concern in other sections, states, regions, and nations—are likely to spread to other communities. The involvement of subversive manipulation increases the probability. The problem of identifying subversive manipulation in a tense and potentially explosive social atmosphere is extremely important.

The consideration of certain prohibitions to be placed in effect on the behavior of dissident individuals and groups presents some problems. The necessity for the prohibition and the anticipated reaction of the public must be correctly evaluated. Ill-timed acts of punishment may arouse new aggression. During this period, numerous complaints by members of the community population may be made to the internal security forces. In dealing with dissidents, internal security forces should not ignore complaints based upon belief rather than fact, since people have a tendency to act upon what they believe regardless of the facts.<sup>68</sup>

Reestablishing and maintaining public confidence is a problem area. In many instances involving riots against public authorities, the lack of public confidence has been a contributing factor. A substantial number of those either directly or indirectly involved in the rioting will welcome the return to normality, although they may not be able to verbalize it because of community social

pressures or individual threats and intimidation. Feelings of relief and cooperation are likely to occur after an outbreak of aggression is brought under control.

Although there are some feelings of relief which follow civil disturbances, the population of a community may remain in a high state of anxiety. Individuals usually are anxious for some information about the situation. The subversive manipulator may capitalize upon this desire for information by starting rumors, issuing false reports, and slanting factual information in order to heighten the emotional level of the population.

Community officials have a tendency to feel that they are in some way responsible for the occurrence of civil disturbances, and this feeling interferes, to some extent, with the necessary reporting, recording, and evaluating of information about civil disturbances. Operational necessity is also a contributing factor to the lack of adequate reporting, recording, and administration of remedial action. Many civil disturbances occur during the summer months when members of internal security forces are taking annual leave. The force is then operating at a disadvantage and must be even more selective in its functions. Civilian police forces normally do not have the training or facilities for conducting research and, therefore, are unable to systematically evaluate the information that has been reported and recorded. The primary objective during this phase is for internal security forces to maintain public safety, law, order, and confidence, thereby preventing the outbreak of further violence. Information bearing upon the situation should be issued to the public.

The establishment of a systematic procedure for reporting and recording the information concerned with the civil disturbance and the adjustment of organizational posture, planning, and operations based upon an objective evaluation of this information are required. In the post civil disturbance situation involving subversive manipulation, special methods and techniques must be employed to prevent the spread of violence or the widening of its impact. The internal

security forces should avoid making commitments which they are not able to fulfill or imposing restrictions which cannot be enforced. Such actions have the effect of undermining authority and decreasing public confidence. 69

All methods and techniques of intelligence information collection continue to be utilized. Any attempt by the subversive manipulator to capitalize upon the situation must be detected and the appropriate countermeasures introduced. The spread of rumors and increased interpersonal tensions between rival group members, or between dissident individuals and members of the internal security forces, should be reported. The leaders of dissatisfied groups may be invited to air their complaints at meetings attended by internal security forces and other government officials. Attempts may be made to form committees of citizens to talk over problems.

All the information relative to the tactical phases of the civil disturbance should be collected, recorded, and systematically evaluated to expedite completion of an after-action report. Operational interference may be handled by giving this effort a high priority and by, if necessary, minimizing the effort devoted to other internal security force functions until this task is accomplished.

#### IV. CONCLUSIONS

In studying civil disturbances, one must deal with the distortion inherent in accounts by participants. This distortion results from emotionality and from the personal biases of individuals rendering the reports. A member of a group which has just been subjected to police control measures during a riot may tend to see the past, present, or future behavior of any policeman as hostile and threatening. The policeman who has just gone through the very trying experience of suppressing a violent civil disturbance may tend to see the actions of all the members of the rioting crowd as unwarranted, unexplainable, and unprovoked. Some newspaper reporters, it would seem, tend to play up sensational incidents that make "good reading," thus adding to the distortion.

But even with biased data, when large amounts of material are analyzed, certain patterns emerge which, it is reasonable to assume, have some basis in reality. Further, in comparing the information on the nature and formation of crowds and civil disturbances, both that produced by social scientists and that produced by operational personnel, one finds that there is much consistency and compatibility. In applying the conceptual framework developed in this paper to both types of information and to eyewitness accounts, the advantages and disadvantages of both subversives and security forces came into focus in a way conducive to planning countermeasures. An advantage that exists for one of the participants is usually a disadvantage for the other. Throughout the course of events, each participant is trying to maximize his advantages and minimize his disadvantages.

This report has described the behavior of the principal participants involved in subversively manipulated civil disturbances. At this point in the

development of collective behavior theory there are many gaps in knowledge and most of the existing theory has not been empirically validated. There are also some points of difference among members of the various internal security forces concerned with controlling crowds and civil disturbances at the operational level. The report in its present outline form suggests questions in a number of areas. These questions may be answered and the points of difference resolved by conducting additional research in the following areas:

- (1) Refinement of the conceptual framework.
- (2) Analysis of empirical data presently available.
- (3) Case studies of subversive manipulation of civil disturbances in the different phases of insurgency.
- (4) Cross-cultural comparisons and analysis of case studies.
- (5) Utilization of the further refined research framework for studying the prediction of civil disturbances.

Based upon information in this report, it is possible to propose a series of questions, the answers to which should increase understanding of the subversive manipulation of crowds and civil disturbances and provide information upon which countermeasures may be based and evaluated. The questions are listed under the research area that might be concentrated on in answering them. These questions may be studied singly, in any combination, or with other research methods.

#### **REFINEMENT OF THE RESEARCH FRAMEWORK**

- (1) How can the conceptual framework of the tactical phases of civil disturbance be improved to permit a more efficient description and analysis of the subversive manipulation of civil disturbances?
- (2) Can a more efficient treatment of the subversive manipulation of crowds and civil disturbances be accomplished by analyzing types of crowds, individually and in various combinations?
- (3) What indicators of subversive manipulation can be developed by using the method and framework of this study?
- (4) What criteria can be used to effectively evaluate such indicators?

The four tactical phases used in this study can be further subdivided for the purpose of a more precise description and analysis of the behavior of the participants. For example, the precrowd phase can be further subdivided into periods of time when the civil disturbance is only a remote possibility and the time when it is imminent.

The crowd phase may be further subdivided into that period of time when the crowd has just formed and the time when it has reached such an emotional state that civil disturbance appears unavoidable.

The civil disturbance phase can be further subdivided into the time when the disturbance has begun, when it is spreading, when it is out of control, and when it is being brought under control.

The post civil disturbance phase could be subdivided into periods when rioting has ceased but when alert and precautionary measures are still in effect, when initial court action is being taken against those arrested and community life is returning to normal, and, more remotely, when security forces are reporting and recording information to be used in analyzing the disturbance, planning countermeasures to future disturbances, and attempting to remove the causes of the subversive instigation.

The general categories of participants can be further defined and characterized. Using the crowd classification based upon manner of formation—planned crowds, conventional crowds, and spontaneous crowds—the tactical phases can be used to analyze the behavior of the participants in situations which involve any of the three types of crowds. Utilizing a crowd classification based upon purpose—hostile crowds, escape crowds, acquisitive crowds, expressive crowds, and spectator crowds—the tactical phases can be used to analyze these types. Further useful analysis seems possible with crowds classified according to social composition or type of leadership.

Studies refining the tactical phases and the classification of participants should be undertaken to investigate civil disturbance from the points of view of both the subversives and the internal security forces.

## THE ANALYSIS OF EMPIRICAL DATA

(1) What are the characteristics of the variables involved in civil disturbances: their duration and time of occurrence (i. e. , time of day, day of week, season of year) ?

(2) How does culture influence the variables and parameters related to crowds and civil disturbances ?

(3) In what ways does subversive manipulation affect the variables related to civil disturbance ?

Empirical data from such sources as The New York Times Index should be qualitatively and quantitatively analyzed in order to answer these questions, both to establish characteristics for critical variables previously identified and to identify additional significant variables. Much of this information is biased in that it is in the form of eyewitness accounts by participants and observers, but if the nature of the bias is known, it is still possible that systematically treated data will indicate significant behavior patterns and trends.

## CASE STUDIES

(1) In what ways does culture influence decisions involving the priorities of force ?

(2) What are the cultural similarities and differences in the subversive manipulation of civil disturbances ?

(3) What is the influence of culture upon specific crowd and civil disturbance variables ?

The case study method offers an excellent opportunity for increasing the body of knowledge about the subversive manipulation of crowds and civil disturbances. Community conflict that has resulted in social turbulence such as riots can be studied in individual cases or by comparing cases across communities



to provide a more complete description of the phenomenon and to reveal sub-cultural and cultural similarities and differences. In this manner the substantial amount of expert and consistent thought and theory can be checked against objective reality.

#### **SUBVERSIVE MANIPULATION DURING INSURGENCY**

(1) How is the role of the subversive manipulation of crowds and civil disturbances involved in the several phases of insurgency?

(2) How is the subversive manipulation of crowds and civil disturbances utilized in latent and incipient periods of insurgency to influence the conditions conducive to insurgency?

(3) How is the subversive manipulation of crowds and civil disturbances integrated with other means available during the organized guerrilla phase of an insurgency to advance the subversive cause?

(4) How is the subversive manipulation of crowds and civil disturbances utilized in the war-of-movement phase of insurgency to assist in the capture of urban areas and symbolic cities such as religious, economic, political, and national centers?

The use of the subversive manipulation should be studied to determine how the manipulators take advantage of the impact of national issues upon communities to instigate and utilize community conflict in influencing and capitalizing upon civil disturbances.

Phase I of insurgency is characterized as latent or incipient insurgency with circumstances in which subversive incidents and activities occur frequently and with an organized pattern. There are usually no major outbreaks of violence or periods of uncontrolled insurgent activity. At this time the amount of subversive manipulation is difficult to determine and the subversives in many instances gain a time advantage over the internal security forces which is difficult to overcome. Countermeasures initiated during this phase are less expensive in terms of manpower and money and less disrupting to the country concerned than those initiated during the later phases of insurgency.

Phase II is characterized by organized guerrilla warfare. The subversive movement has gained enough external or local support to initiate organized guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against the government. At this time subversively manipulated collective violence can be used with other means to gain control of large urban areas and to tie down government combat forces needed elsewhere to fight the insurgents. Militant armed groups can be created from dissident members of the crowd. These forces can aid in the final defeat of the government forces and then assist in exercising the police powers of the insurgent government.

During this phase the population is in a high state of anxiety and the outcome of the struggle may be in doubt. Based upon the knowledge of subversive operations, it is reasonable to assume that the anxious population is vulnerable to subversive manipulation. It also appears that insurgent pressure against individuals, groups, and organizations has an increased chance of success as these individuals, groups, and organizations attempt to insure their future against a possible victory of the insurgents.

Phase III of an insurgency is characterized by the activity of the other phases and in addition war of movement. At this point the insurgency has become essentially a war of movement between organized forces of the insurgents and those of the government. During this period the population may be subjected to severe deprivations of the necessities of life such as food and shelter. They might be expected to respond more easily to rumors and to engage in acquisitive riots in order to gain food and other essentials of survival.

## THE PREDICTION OF CIVIL DISTURBANCES

### Can Civil Disturbances Be Predicted?

It appears that much of what passes for "prediction" in civil disturbances is actually "postdiction," in that after an episode of collective violence, claims

are made to prediction based upon the existence of certain specific conditions within a community prior to a riot. The approach is not systematic or scientific; no attempts are made to determine if the same conditions existed in other communities where civil disturbances did not occur. It is also known that the selectivity and distortion involved in remembering probably influence this "postdiction."

At this stage in the development of knowledge about riotous behavior, predictions cannot be solely considered in terms of "will or will not occur," but must also be thought of in terms of probability: Do the indicators suggest a low, medium, or high chance of occurrence?

Meaningful prediction depends upon the identification of indicators and the development of criteria for evaluating them. A study concerned with the development of such indicators and criteria, both for predicting civil disturbances and for determining the amount of subversive manipulation, would be most appropriate in an age where subversive manipulation of crowds and civil disturbances appears to be an integral part of attempts to illegally achieve political power.

## FOOTNOTES

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<sup>3</sup>Hadley Cantril, "Causes and Control of Riots and Panic," Public Opinion Quarterly, VII, No. 4 (Winter 1943), 669-79.

<sup>4</sup>Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 1.

<sup>5</sup>K. Smellie, "Riot," Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, XIII (New York: Macmillan Co., 1957), 386-88.

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<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 387.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., pp. 387-88.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 387.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>Robert Shogan and Thomas Craig, The Detroit Race Riot (Philadelphia, Pa: Chilton Co., 1964).

<sup>13</sup>Kenneth B. Clark and James Barker, "A Participant in the Harlem Riot," in Ralph H. Turner and Lewis Killian, Collective Behavior (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1957), pp. 87-88.

<sup>14</sup>U.S., Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Report Concerning the Riot Situations Which Occurred Within the U.S., Summer, 1964 (Washington, D.C.: FBI, September 18, 1964), p. 8.

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid., pp. 387-88.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., pp. 388-89.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 389.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. 390.

<sup>24</sup> Rudé, op. cit.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., pp. 214-15.

<sup>26</sup> David Krech, Richard S. Crutchfield, and Egerton L. Ballachey, Individual in Society (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1962), pp. 308-309.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> James S. Coleman, Community Conflict (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1957), p. 9.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., pp. 9-12.

<sup>30</sup> Westley, op. cit., pp. 15-33.

<sup>31</sup> U.S., Department of the Army, FM 19-15, Civil Disturbances and Disasters (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, September 1958), p. 2.

<sup>32</sup> Westley, op. cit., pp. 15-31.

<sup>33</sup> U.S., Department of the Army, Civil Disturbances and Disasters, op. cit., p. 6.

<sup>34</sup> For further information on the strategy and tactics of subversion, see Andrew R. Molnar et al., Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary and Resistance Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Special Operations Research Office, November 1963), passim.

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<sup>36</sup> U.S., Congress, Senate, Internal Security Subcommittee, Communist Threat to the United States Through the Caribbean, Part 2, supplemented by a

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<sup>38</sup> Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), p. 83.

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<sup>42</sup> Methvin, op. cit., p. 33.

<sup>43</sup> U.S., FBI Report, op. cit., p. 3.

<sup>44</sup> U.S., Congress, Senate, Internal Security Subcommittee, Communist Threat Through Caribbean, op. cit., p. 130.

<sup>45</sup> Methvin, op. cit., p. 35.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., p. 35.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., pp. 35-36.

<sup>48</sup> Leo Lowenthal and Norbert Guterman, "Portrait of an American Agitator," Public Opinion Quarterly, V (1948), 417-29.

<sup>49</sup> Smelser, op. cit., p. 11.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid. p. 11.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., p. 81.

<sup>52</sup> International Commission of Jurists, Report on the Events in Panama, January 9-12, 1964 (Geneva, Switzerland: International Commission of Jurists, 1964), p. 21.

<sup>53</sup> Methvin, op. cit., p. 37.

<sup>54</sup> Rex Applegate, Kill or Get Killed (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Telegraph Press, 1962), pp. 375-76.

<sup>55</sup> U.S., Congress, Senate, Internal Security Subcommittee, Communist Threat Through Caribbean, op. cit., pp. 119, 145.

<sup>56</sup> U.S., Federal Civil Defense Administration, "The Problem of Panic," Civil Defense Technical Bulletin, TB-19-2 (June 1955), pp. 1-2.

<sup>57</sup> Westley, op. cit., p. 35.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., p. 37.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., p. 85.

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<sup>61</sup> H. L. Nieburg, "Uses of Violence," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, VII, No. 1 (March 1, 1963), 43-54.

<sup>62</sup> Federation of Malaya, The Emergency Regulations Ordinance (1948) (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1953), pp. 45-47.

<sup>63</sup> These provisions are contained in the Republic of South Africa General Law Amendment Act, No. 76 of 1962. This act amends the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, the Public Safety Act of 1953, the Criminal Procedure Act of 1955, the Riotous Assembly Act of 1956, and the Unlawful Organization Act of 1960.

<sup>64</sup> Smelser, op. cit., p. 234.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., p. 1.

<sup>66</sup> Westley, op. cit., p. 15.

<sup>67</sup> Rex Applegate, "New Riot Control Weapons," Ordinance, XLIX, No. 265, 69-70.

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

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all the internal tensions of the country under attack which might influence its population (e.g., ideological, social, religious, and economic). Furthermore, due to the interdependence of nations, any dissident movement, no matter how localized and limited, will be quickly brought by determined opponents into the framework of the great world conflict.

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<p>Civil disturbances have occurred throughout history in many areas of the world, especially during periods of rapid social, economic, and political change. Recent civil disturbances manipulated to subvert existing governmental authority have added a new dimension to the problem of maintaining internal security. The participants in a subversively manipulated civil disturbance can be identified as: (1) the dissident groups; (2) the crowd; (3) the subversive manipulators; (4) the internal security forces; and (5) the general population of the community concerned. The principal protagonists are the internal security forces and the subversive manipulators. The civil disturbance consists of four identifiable phases: (1) the precrowd phase; (2) the crowd phase; (3) the civil disturbance phase; and (4) the post civil disturbance phase. During each of these phases the subversive manipulators and the internal security forces are engaged in characteristic forms of behavior in order to accomplish their respective objectives. Each of the protagonists encounters problems in attempting to gain his objectives and employs specific methods and techniques in performing functions designed to solve the problems and attain the objectives. A systematic study of the patterns of development of civil disturbances and the tactics of the subversive manipulators is made to identify countermeasures for controlling the subversive manipulation of civil disturbances. ( )</p>		

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